Thursday, September 12, 2013

LOC to LAC: COMBINED AFFAIR


The recent heightened cease fire violations along the LOC with Pakistan and the continued ingress by the Chinese in Ladakh and Arunachal Pradesh along the LAC needs to be viewed with concern as compared to the relatively quiet border couple of months earlier. Ever since Pak Premier Nawaz Sharief  has assumed office the border flare ups have gone up. Either these incidents are with his connivance or he has no hold on the Pak military. Which ever way one looks at, the sanctity of the ceasefire has been broken and would henceforth remain a continued proxy war.

The CBM measures with China along with assurances to maintain peace and tranquility along the LAC are repeatedly broken with intrusion in Ladakh as well as in North East. Although no firing has taken place, it cannot be ruled out that in future it may not happen. The excuse given as to the perception of the LAC by either side at every violation has to be substantiated by maps and ground positions. The infrastructure along the LAC on the Chinese side is well developed with network of roads and railway duly supported by airfields for logistic support in case of war. Comparatively India is badly off when it comes to infrastructure. All border roads development projects are behind schedule or non existent in a large number of forward posts leaving it to the Airforce to support for logistical backups or movement of troops in case the situation demands.

The thought process that India would face either Pak or China in any war scenario can be put in cold storage. India will have to be prepared to deal with LOC and LAC activity simultaneously on twin fronts and will have to prepare accordingly. The idea of switching forces from one theatre to another as was done during the Kargil War can be ruled out convincingly. On, both the LOC and LAC, India needs to have adequate force levels to deal with any eventuality with logistic backup and air support.

Indian politico- bureaucracy should get over the fear that military coup-de-etat can take place. The chances are remote as India is too vast a country with multi lingual religions. So, therefore raising of para military forces to counter the military should be shelved and the military should be given its rightful place in being part of the National Security apparatus for which it is meant

LOC with Pakistan

After the Kargil War, India deployed more formations to guard the LOC and reoriented the area of responsibility of the 14, 15 and 16 Corps formations. As on date India is adequately poised to deal with Pak effectively. India has made it clear to Pak that Siachen will not be vacated under any circumstance which is of strategic importance to both Pak and China as India can blockade the Karakoram Highway. The pressure to vacate Siachen will remain and India should remain steadfast. Pak has given away Saksham Valley to China on lease. This is adjoining Siachen and strategic to the Karakoram highway.

At other places along the LOC, the stalemate will continue. Neither India nor Pak are in a position to capture POK or J&K. Option to convert LOC into a International Border (IB) would not be agreeable to either country. India will have to firmly deal with the terror outfits and should put all talks on hold till such time Pak gives up aiding these covertly operating organizations.

At other places along the LOC, the stalemate will continue. Neither India nor Pak are in a position to capture POK or J&K. Option to convert LOC into a International Border (IB) would not be agreeable to either country. India will have to firmly deal with the terror outfits and should put all talks on hold till such time Pak gives up aiding these covertly operating organizations.

 

 

With this as the backdrop, a holistic view of the deployment and operational control of the BSF/ITBP/SSB should be taken and restructuring where required should be carried out. As has been the pattern to dply BSF along the International border (IB) should continue but to use BSF/ITBP/SSB along the LOC in penny packets of battalion/company level strength under the Home Ministry is certainly not advocated as it amounts to dual command of troops which can work counter productive in situations where army has to take decisions. Along the LOC wherever BSF units are dply, these should be under the operational and administrative control of the army. Use of ITBP/SSB units along the LOC should be avoided.

If at all BSF/ITBP/SSB units have to be used in the valley, then such units should be dply in the hinterland to augument the army resources in cordon and search, and law and order issues. Again this should be under unified command of the highest military officer present in location. The  Police-Army equation needs to be revisited and should be restored as it existed earlier. When it comes to National Security personal egos and one up man ship needs to be set aside. Even political interference should be limited. Only then can the Army-Police-Politico-babus combine can achieve the desired goals.

Strategic Triangle (Siachen-Karakoram Pass- Daulet Beg Oldie)
To follow:

 

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