The recent heightened cease fire violations along
the LOC with Pakistan and the continued ingress by the Chinese in Ladakh and
Arunachal Pradesh along the LAC needs to be viewed with concern as compared to
the relatively quiet border couple of months earlier. Ever since Pak Premier
Nawaz Sharief has assumed office the
border flare ups have gone up. Either these incidents are with his connivance
or he has no hold on the Pak military. Which ever way one looks at, the
sanctity of the ceasefire has been broken and would henceforth remain a
continued proxy war.
The CBM measures with China along with assurances to
maintain peace and tranquility along the LAC are repeatedly broken with
intrusion in Ladakh as well as in North East. Although no firing has taken
place, it cannot be ruled out that in future it may not happen. The excuse
given as to the perception of the LAC by either side at every violation has to
be substantiated by maps and ground positions. The infrastructure along the LAC
on the Chinese side is well developed with network of roads and railway duly
supported by airfields for logistic support in case of war. Comparatively India
is badly off when it comes to infrastructure. All border roads development
projects are behind schedule or non existent in a large number of forward posts
leaving it to the Airforce to support for logistical backups or movement of
troops in case the situation demands.
The thought process that India would face either Pak
or China in any war scenario can be put in cold storage. India will have to be
prepared to deal with LOC and LAC activity simultaneously on twin fronts and
will have to prepare accordingly. The idea of switching forces from one theatre
to another as was done during the Kargil War can be ruled out convincingly. On,
both the LOC and LAC, India needs to have adequate force levels to deal with
any eventuality with logistic backup and air support.
Indian politico- bureaucracy should get over the
fear that military coup-de-etat can take place. The chances are remote as India
is too vast a country with multi lingual religions. So, therefore raising of
para military forces to counter the military should be shelved and the military
should be given its rightful place in being part of the National Security apparatus
for which it is meant
LOC
with Pakistan
After the Kargil War, India deployed more formations
to guard the LOC and reoriented the area of responsibility of the 14, 15 and 16
Corps formations. As on date India is adequately poised to deal with Pak
effectively. India has made it clear to Pak that Siachen will not be vacated
under any circumstance which is of strategic importance to both Pak and China
as India can blockade the Karakoram Highway. The pressure to vacate Siachen
will remain and India should remain steadfast. Pak has given away Saksham
Valley to China on lease. This is adjoining Siachen and strategic to the
Karakoram highway.
At other places along the LOC, the stalemate will
continue. Neither India nor Pak are in a position to capture POK or J&K.
Option to convert LOC into a International Border (IB) would not be agreeable
to either country. India will have to firmly deal with the terror outfits and
should put all talks on hold till such time Pak gives up aiding these covertly
operating organizations.
At other places along the LOC, the stalemate will
continue. Neither India nor Pak are in a position to capture POK or J&K.
Option to convert LOC into a International Border (IB) would not be agreeable
to either country. India will have to firmly deal with the terror outfits and
should put all talks on hold till such time Pak gives up aiding these covertly
operating organizations.
With this as the backdrop, a holistic view of the
deployment and operational control of the BSF/ITBP/SSB should be taken and
restructuring where required should be carried out. As has been the pattern to
dply BSF along the International border (IB) should continue but to use
BSF/ITBP/SSB along the LOC in penny packets of battalion/company level strength
under the Home Ministry is certainly not advocated as it amounts to dual command
of troops which can work counter productive in situations where army has to
take decisions. Along the LOC wherever BSF units are dply, these should be
under the operational and administrative control of the army. Use of ITBP/SSB
units along the LOC should be avoided.
If at all BSF/ITBP/SSB units have to be used in the
valley, then such units should be dply in the hinterland to augument the army
resources in cordon and search, and law and order issues. Again this should be
under unified command of the highest military officer present in location.
The Police-Army equation needs to be
revisited and should be restored as it existed earlier. When it comes to
National Security personal egos and one up man ship needs to be set aside. Even
political interference should be limited. Only then can the
Army-Police-Politico-babus combine can achieve the desired goals.
Strategic
Triangle (Siachen-Karakoram Pass- Daulet Beg Oldie)
To follow:
